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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the feasibility of using Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in conducting 
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and analyzes the suite of 
LCS mission packages in conducting HA/DR operations through a Systems Engineering 
study. The current preference for HA/DR operations is on using big decks, e.g., 
Amphibious Ship and Aircraft Carriers to maximize the lift capability of supplies, such as 
medical supplies, food, and water. The trade-off of using big decks instead of small ships 
such as the LCS is to forfeit speed and the ability to dock nearer to shore, yet having the 
fuel capacity to travel long distances, and also the capacity to carry large loads of 
supplies.   
The thesis focuses on two main areas. The first is to study the feasibility of the 
LCS to conduct HA/DR operations. The second is to study the HA/DR operations 
functional allocation, and propose possible Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) and 
mission package for the LCS to effectively carry out the operations. 
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The Navy’s primary concern from 1889 to 1989 was “sea control,” where naval planners 
prepared to fight the world’s great naval forces in blue water. However, after the Cold 
War, the United States (U.S.) Navy found itself in a debate on the need for naval 
transformation. It was realized that the era of sea control was over, and the new challenge 
was fighting in the littorals. The new threat environment consists less of large blue-water 
navies and more of smaller, more agile, and possibly high-tech threats, fighting in littoral 
regions. The Navy soon realized the need for a ship capable of operating in littoral areas, 
successfully engaging fast and agile vessels and able to incorporate unmanned 
technologies defensively and offensively. Despite congressional doubts, design and 
development of the modular, mission-focused Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) continued. In 
2003, the Navy launched Sea Power 21 transformation plan. Sea Power 21 (Clark, 2002) 
emphasizes the building of decisive war-fighting capabilities around three concepts: Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. The newly developed LCS will play an integral role 
in Sea Power 21, especially in Sea Shield, contributing its ability to respond quickly, 
operate in littoral areas, and conduct focused missions with its suite of mission packages.    
Over the years, the number of disasters reported each year was increasing. Recent 
examples include the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Haitian 
earthquake (2010) and the most recent Japanese earthquake (2011). The Department of 
Defense (DoD) has always been at the forefront of Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR) operations throughout the globe and is increasingly taking the lead in 
initial-response efforts. The Navy plays a large part in such operations with its global 
naval force. The use of surface ships, generally in the form of an Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG) or Carrier Strike Group (CSG), has greatly enabled the Navy in undertaking 
this responsibility effectively. 
A Systems Engineering study is conducted to examine the feasibility of using the 
LCS in HA/DR operations. Through the problem formulation, it was observed that big 
decks, e.g., Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious ships have the capability to travel long 
distances, and the capacity to carry large amount of cargo. However, they may be slow 
 xviii 
and are unable to dock at ports due to their large draft. Smaller ships, e.g., Destroyers, 
and Cruisers have high speed, and low draft, but do not have the capacity to carry cargo. 
The Navy thus needs to look into other available means, concepts of operations, and 
platforms for a more efficient and effective manner of conducting HA/DR operations.   
Major stakeholders and their primary needs are then identified and examined. 
These stakeholders include the disaster victims, the host nation government, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) and the military. The primary need is to assist the 
disaster victims to stay alive, look for the missing, and also to rebuild the nation.  
A functional decomposition and mission requirements based on the capability 
need and stakeholder views are developed. The functional decomposition outlines the set 
of functions to be accomplished for any HA/DR operations. These functions are then 
mapped to mission requirements for the Navy. Generally, the Navy will only provide 
HA/DR operations in the form of immediate relief aid, particularly to supply relief aid, 
co-ordinate relief aid efforts and also to provide security for HA/DR operations for the 
humanitarian actors. From the mission requirements, a set of classification metrics is 
developed to help assess the feasibility of the LCS in HA/DR operations. The assessment 
of the ship was conducted by understanding the ships’ capability and rating the capability 
with accordance to the classification. 
The assessment was done on the LCS, Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious ships. In 
comparison with the Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious ships, the LCS with its current set 
of mission packages seems to be slightly lacking in the ability to conduct HA/DR 
operations. While the LCS excels in speed, shallow draft and it having a full suite of 
sensors, there are some shortcomings including, limited capacity to carry cargo and 
personnel, limited medical support facilities onboard, and also limited endurance when 
travelling at sprint speed. 
To help overcome the shortcomings of the LCS in conducting HA/DR operations, 
the Irregular Warfare (IW) mission package is studied. The mission package is designed 
with the following considerations: Modularization, Standardization and Training and 
consists of the following mission modules: Personnel Berthing and Support, Cargo 
 xix 
Capacity, Medical Support, Material Handling, Search and Rescue and Self Defense. The 
IW mission package is meant for the LCS to be more effective and efficient at conducting 
HA/DR operations. 
Despite the limitations in cargo and personnel capacity and lack of medical 
support, the LCS is still deemed as a feasible solution to conducting HA/DR operations, 
due to its high sprint speed, which allows the LCS to reach the disaster region faster than 
any other ships, especially if the IW mission package is adopted. The mission 
requirements assessment shows that the LCS with IW mission package shows 
improvements in capacity to carry cargo and personnel and medical support and thus is 
better suited to carry out HA/DR operations. The HA/DR Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) is developed for the LCS so that they can be better prepared to conduct 
HA/DR operations. The LCS HA/DR CONOPs does not differ much from the combat 
CONOPS in terms of employment. There are two main types of deployment, mainly: 
Integrated with Carrier Strike Group (CSG) / Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and 
Independent Operations. The CONOPs for both types of employment are discussed. 
This thesis adopted the Systems Engineering approach, in which the problem is 
first formulated and analyzed. The development of the functional decomposition and 
mission requirements is vital to the study of the feasibility of using the LCS in HA/DR 
operations. Beyond the study of the feasibility, the thesis also discusses the physical 
allocation, in which a fourth mission package is designed to enable the LCS to conduct 
HA/DR operations more efficiently and effectively. Specific CONOPs are also developed 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States (U.S.) Navy is “organized, trained, and equipped primarily for 
prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea” (Work, 2004). The Navy 
inventory consists of ships, submarines, aircraft, unmanned systems, and the men and 
women who operate the equipment. Ships are the Navy’s strongest assets, comprising 
aircraft carriers, surface combatants such as cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious 
ships, mine-warfare vessels, combat-logistics-force ships and other auxiliary and support 
craft such as command ships and ocean-surveillance vessels.   
The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in a long-running debate on the need for 
naval transformation. Beginning with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the 
Navy has experienced a changing threat environment. The new threat environment 
consists less of large blue-water navies and more of smaller, more agile, and possibly 
high-tech threats. Potential adversaries are likely to fight in littoral regions, employing 
the use of small, littoral surface crafts, diesel submarines, shore-based missiles, and 
asymmetrical mines. Additionally, the Navy must contend with the rapid development of 
high-tech, unmanned vehicles, whether aerial, surface, or underwater. The Navy realized 
the need for a ship capable of operating in littoral areas, successfully engaging fast and 
agile vessels and able to incorporate unmanned technologies defensively and offensively. 
This led to the design and development of the modular, mission-focused Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS). 
In 2004, the Navy awarded LCS building contracts to two teams, Lockheed 
Martin (LM) and General Dynamics (GM). The teams had different hull-type designs, 
with the LM version a steel, semi-planning, advanced steel monohull (See Figure 1), and 
the GM version a less-traditional aluminum trimaran hull (O'Rourke, 2012), shown in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 1.    Lockheed Martin LCS design (From HIS Jane’s, 2012a) 
 
Figure 2.   General Dynamics LCS design (From HIS Jane’s, 2012b) 
Both LCS designs adopt a unique, newly developed mission-modular technology. 
The LCS seaframe forms the core of the LCS and possesses inherent self-defense 
capabilities only. The LCS seaframe can be augmented with different warfare-mission 
packages to adapt to missions in three domains: Mine Countermeasures (MCM), 
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), and Surface Warfare (SUW). The interchangeable 
 3 
mission packages are used to configure the LCS for different missions, installing quickly 
to fulfill a mission and uninstalling for storage when not required (NAVSEA Warfare 
Center). As seen in Figure 3, the mission package essentially consists of mission systems 
(MS), support equipment, and crew and support aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 3.   LCS Mission Package (From NAVSEA Warfare Center) 
 In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of Humanitarian 
Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations, such as those deployed after the Indian 
Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Haitian earthquake (2010) and the 
most recent Japanese earthquake (2011). For all these disaster occurrences, large, 
coordinated, and fast response is required. The Department of Defense (DoD) has always 
been at the forefront of disaster response throughout the globe and is increasingly taking 
the lead in initial-response efforts. The Navy, as part of a global naval force, assumes a 
large part of the responsibility in ensuring the leadership of the DoD in HA/DR efforts. 
The use of surface ships, generally in the form of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
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or Carrier Strike Group (CSG), has greatly enabled the Navy in undertaking this 
responsibility effectively. 
 Speed is a significant priority in delivering relief aid to disaster areas. The LCS, 
designed to be fast and agile, addresses this priority. The LCS is expected to add to 
current capabilities because it can speed to a disaster area faster than an ESG or CSG and 
get closer to shore because of its shallow draft. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines the LCS and studies its feasibility in HA/DR operations. The 
following questions help guide this study: 
• What are the functions and requirements for ships deployed for HA/DR 
operations? 
• What is the feasibility, and possible advantages or shortcomings of using 
LCSs for HA/DR operations? 
• What are the possible concepts of operations involving the use of the 
LCS? 
• What is a possible logistical mission package required for an LCS for 
HA/DR operations? 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study provides insight on the functional decomposition and mission 
requirements for a HA/DR operation through a Systems Engineering study. The mission 
requirements are then applied to the LCS to determine its feasibility in HA/DR operations 
and the logistical mission package required. Additionally, the study provides insight on 
the comparative capabilities between the LCS, Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious ships 
for HA/DR operations. 
 
 5 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE DOCUMENT 
Chapter II consists of a literature review of the LCS and recent HA/DR 
operations, exploring their background and requirements. Chapter III defines the problem 
and describes a Systems Engineering approach. Chapter IV provides a study on the 
feasibility of the LCS in HA/DR operations, suggested Concept of Operations, and an 
insight in the possible logistical-mission package for the LCS. Chapter V provides a 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. LCS PROGRAM 
1. History 
The U.S. Navy originally performed three broad missions: protecting U.S. 
overseas trade and interests; defending the American coast from attack; and conducting 
commerce raiding. This led to the Navy developing relatively short-range coastal defense 
ships operating in home waters and long-range combatants located overseas. In 1883, 
with the development of the steel steam-powered cruiser, Congress approved a naval-
transformation program that was to eventually result in the “new Navy.” The new-Navy 
strategy required the fleet to be organized, trained, and equipped to destroy any opposing 
enemy fleet and to establish “control of the seas” (Work, 2004).   This resulted in a fleet 
structure consisting of large battleships and armored cruisers; an intermediate class of 
cruisers and gunboats; and a new class of small “torpedo-boat destroyers.”  It was here, 
during the battleship era, that the U.S. Navy moved up to second place among world 
navies and by World War II surpassed the British Royal Navy as the premier naval 
power. 
The shift from the battleship era to the carrier era occurred during World War II, 
when the aircraft carrier became the preeminent ship in the Navy’s total-ship battle force. 
The main difference between the two eras was the deployment of the fleet in battle. 
During the battleship era, the Navy trained to fight as a single war-fighting entity. By 
contrast, during the carrier era, the battle fleet operated in wide-ranging, dispersed, carrier 
task groups, made possible by the growing numbers of aircraft carriers in the Navy and 
the improved range and fighting power of the aircraft. The fleet’s operational architecture 
also evolved during the shift to the carrier era. Instead of viewing the fleet as a single, 
concentrated battle line, the fleet was viewed as independent strike groups, capable of 
accomplishing missions themselves or combining in different ways to complete missions. 
Such operational architecture made the battle fleet more flexible and improved its ability 
to exert influence over a wider geographic area than during the battleship era. Said 
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another way, the battle fleet had transformed itself from a concentrated striking force to a 
dispersed striking force capable of concentration (Work, 2004). 
Various technological advances achieved during the carrier era now suggest an 
impending shift to a new battle-fleet model. First, the introduction of a new missile-
launching system—the Vertical Launch System (VLS)—resulted in the dramatic 
reduction of special purpose, above-deck launchers on fleet surface combatants. The 
compact nature of the VLS allows smaller-hulled ships to be equipped with antiaircraft 
warfare (AAW) combat systems. As a result, the offensive striking power of the carrier-
era fleet will no longer be concentrated on the carrier decks. Instead, other surface 
combatants and submarines will augment the carriers, increasing their striking power. 
Second, the focus is on Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), which hinges on the idea of 
linking widely distributed fleet sensors and defensive and offensive firepower to form 
coherent joint and fleet “battle networks.” It is thought that the sensory and defensive and 
offensive capabilities of the battle fleet will be improved by having a large number of 
manned and unmanned systems, instead of relying on small numbers of heavily armed 
ships. Finally, the development of unmanned systems has sparked interest in the 
incorporation of unmanned technology into NCW. The increasing cost of manpower is 
also an impetus towards unmanned systems. In unmanned systems, the sensor capability 
of the battle network is greatly enhanced, enabling the battle fleet to see farther and more, 
without the danger of losing men in the process. These factors prompt naval planners to 
envision a model where the battle fleet’s sensory and defensive and offensive striking 
power is distributed across large numbers of highly networked manned and unmanned 
systems, enabling the battle fleet to strike precisely and lethally (Work, 2004).  
After the Cold War, the Navy found itself disoriented by the lack of a first-class 
naval opponent. The Navy’s primary concern in the hundred years from 1889 to 1989 
was “sea control,” where naval planners prepared to fight the world’s great naval forces 
in blue water. These forces included the British Royal Navy and, during the Cold War, 
the Soviet fleet. It was soon realized that the era of sea control was over and that the new 
challenge was fighting in littoral areas. As Admiral Jay Johnson, then Chief of Naval 
Operations, stated in the Naval Operational Concept in 1997: 
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Our attention and efforts will continue to be focused on operating in and 
from the littorals. The landward side of the littoral can be supported and 
defended directly from the sea. It encompasses areas of strategic 
importance to the United States. Seventy-five percent of the Earth’s 
population and a similar proportion of national capitals and major 
commercial centers lie in the littorals. These are the places where 
American influence and power have the greatest impact and are needed 
most often. For forward-deployed naval forces, the littorals are a starting 
point as well as a destination. Tactically, the distance we reach inland 
from the sea depends on terrain and weather, the contributions of joint and 
coalition forces, the potential adversary’s capabilities, and the nature of 
our mission. The mission may require us to exercise our considerable 
reach and operate far inland. (Johnson, 1997)  
 In 1998, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, then the head of the Naval War College 
and Navy Warfare Development Command, emphasized that the new fleet should 
become the nation’s “assured access” force. Assured access refers to the ability of the 
fleet to overcome coastal defenses to enable air (and in some circumstances, ground) 
forces to conduct operations on or over enemy territories (Martin , 2010). The underlying 
purpose is the destruction of the enemy in its own littoral regions, for the Navy to gain 
access into the littorals and the enemy territories. This would be accomplished by the 
Navy’s main battle force, with small networked combatants, which he termed 
“streetfighters,” conducting the engagement seaward of the littorals, protecting the main 
battle force and destroying enemy coastal assets. The concept of small combatants in the 
Navy fleet aroused much debate. Despite congressional doubts, development of the LCS 
proceeded. On November 1, 2001, the Navy announced that it would issue a revised 
request for proposal (RFP) for its future surface-combatant program, known as “DD(X)” 
and comprising three new ships: a large multi-missile destroyer; a large multi-mission, 
guided-missile cruiser; and a small “focused mission” Littoral Combat Ship. The. Navy 
plans to field fifty-five LCS sea frames and sixty-four mission packages, consisting of 
sixteen ASWs, twenty-four MCMs, and twenty-four SUW packages (O'Rourke, 2012). 
2. Design Requirements 
 The LCS is a highly capable, multi-role, but mission focused, small combatant 
that enables the Navy to project into littoral regions and leverage the technology of 
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unmanned vehicles and weaponry to defeat the enemy in its own territory. The LCS is to 
perform surface warfare, mine countermeasure, or antisubmarine warfare in the littoral 
regions, independently or as part of a distributed naval battle network. The contract to 
build the LCS was awarded to both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, with the 
following main design requirements (Martin, 2010).  
a. Independent Operations 
While the LCS can operate as part of a CSG/ESG, it must be capable of 
carrying out independent operations over distances between 3,500 and 4,300 miles, 
travelling at economical speed while carrying between fourteen and twenty-one days of 
provisions. This mandate drives the requirements for seaworthiness, bunker capacity, and 
habitability.  
b. Modularity 
Modularity is the heart of LCS design. The LCS is intended to carry out 
“plug and play” modules, known as mission packages, which can be changed out within 
forty-eight hours, according to the mission assigned to the ship. This modularity enables 
the commander to adjust ship configuration to assigned mission requirements with ease. 
The mission packages emphasize manned and unmanned off-board systems, sensors, and 
weapons systems. 
c. Speed 
The LCS is designed to have a high sprint speed in excess of 40 knots and 
a high sustained speed to enable it to run along a 30+ knots CSG or 20+ knots ESG. The 
high sprint speed enables the LCS to reach its mission destination much faster and is also 
integral to avoiding hits by complicating enemy targeting, allowing quick repositioning 
against threats, and evading torpedoes (O'Rourke, 2012)—thereby improving its 
susceptibility and survivability. 
d. Battle Network Capability 
The LCS’s ability to network with other naval and air assets enables it to 
exchange tactical and operational data and information with other platforms. The LCS is 
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also able to act as a forward command-and-control (C2) hub, controlling not only its own 
off-board assets, but also similar assets deployed by other platforms located over the 
horizon (OTH). This ability enables the LCS to perform scouting missions effectively, 
especially those involving antisubmarine and mine countermeasures. The figure below 
provides an overview of this battle network capability. 
 
 
Figure 4.   LCS Battle Network Capability (From Navy Warfare Development 
Command, 2003) 
3. LCS mission packages 
The LCS is a fast, agile, mission-focused, networked, small surface combatant, 
optimized for operating in littoral regions. An important capability of the LCS is its 
ability to rapidly install interchangeable mission packages onto the seaframe to suit 




specific mission and then uninstalled, maintained, and stored for future use aboard any 
other LCS seaframe (Office of Corporate Communication (SEA 00D), Naval Sea 
Systems Command, 2011). 
A mission package essentially consists of mission modules, mission-crew 
detachments, and support aircraft. A mission module comprises all the equipment, 
hardware, and software required for a particular mission type and is integrated with the 
LCS seaframe. Some examples of mission modules include mission systems (vehicles, 
sensors, communications, and weapon systems), support equipment, mission-package 
computing environment (MPCE) hardware and software, and multiple-vehicle 
communications system (MVCS) hardware and software. The MPCE provides the 
information-technology infrastructure for mission packages operations and the required 
network interfaces to the total-ship computing environment (TSCE). Mission packages 
can be swapped easily to reconfigure an LCS for different missions in a short time. 
Mission equipment fits inside standard ten- or twenty-foot International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) support containers (SCs), or on ISO-compliant flat racks and 
vehicle cradles. The use of standardized ISO SCs facilitates logistics in shipping, storage, 
equipment handling, and container movement. Mission package reconfiguration can be 
done in homeport or overseas, using prepositioned mission packages or mission packages 
transported into theaters and staged near LCS operating areas (Office of Corporate 
Communication (SEA 00D), Naval Sea Systems Command, 2011). There are currently 
three different mission packages for the three focused mission areas of mine-
countermeasure, antisubmarine, and surface warfare. 
a. Mine-Countermeasure Warfare (MCM) mission package 
The MCM mission package allows the LCS to transport and deploy 
manned and unmanned off-board surface and semisubmersible vehicles with MCM 
sensors and systems to the vicinity of the minefield, while remaining outside the mine 
threat itself. This way, sailors are kept out of danger while mine threats are neutralized. 
The suite of off-board sensors and systems will be used to detect, localize, neutralize, and 
sweep mines, if necessary. MCM-configured LCSs will thus be able to clear transit lanes 
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for CSG/ESG, or clear larger operating areas to facilitate joint forcible-entry operations 
(JFEO) (Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ship [PEO LCS]). The baseline 
MCM mission package includes: 
 






- MH-60S helicopter  
- Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)  
- Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)  
- Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) 
- AN/AQS-20A Mine hunting sonar  
- MH-60S support container 
- OASIS support container 
- OAMCM Mission Kit support container 
- ALMDS/AMNS support container 
- AN/AQS-20A support container 
- Organic Cable Reeling Assembly 
- Organic Post Mission Analysis (OPMA) workstation 
Influence Mine 
Sweep Module 
- MCM Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) 
- Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3) 
- USV support container 




- Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV) 
- Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) 
- VTUAV support container 
- COBRA-PMA workstation 
Remote Mine 
Hunting Module 
- Remote Multi-Mission Vehicles (RMMVs) (2) 
- AN/AQS-20A Mine hunting sonars (2) 
- RMMV cradles (2) 
- RMMV capture spindles (2) 
- RMMV container 
- AN/AQS-20A support container 
MP Application 
Software 
- Mission specific application software that supports the MP in 
planning and executing the MCM Missions. 
Table 1.   MCM Mission Package (From Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ship 
[PEO LCS]) 
b. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) mission package 
The ASW mission package enables the LCS to provide joint-force 
commanders with the capability of conducting detect-to-engage operations against 
modern diesel-electric and nuclear submarines in littoral areas, defeating those that pose 
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an immediate threat. Specific ASW capabilities include protecting forces in transit, 
protecting joint operating areas, and establishing an ASW barrier in shallow littorals and 
deep-water approaches to littorals. The ASW-configured LCS can conduct ASW 
missions in support of a CSG/ESG, or while operating as part of an LCS surface action 
group, or independently (Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ship (PEO LCS)). 
The baseline ASW mission package includes: 
 
Mission Module Features 
ASW Escort 
Module 
- Variable-depth sonar (VDS) 
- Multifunction towed array (MFTA) acoustic receiver 
- Launch, handling, and recovery equipment 
- Signal processing and systems control 
- Support containers  
Torpedo Defense 
Module 
- Alertment: MFTA with Acoustic Intercept (ACI) 
- Countermeasures: Lightweight Tow (LWT) 
Aviation Module - MH-60R Helicopter w/ALFS 
- Vertical-Takeoff Unmanned, Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) (2) 
- Support containers 
ASW Mission 
Management / C2 
Center 
- Mission-package application software 
- Networks that interface with the total-ship computing 
environment 
Table 2.   ASW Mission Package (From Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ship 
[PEO LCS]) 
c. Surface Warfare (SUW) mission package 
The SUW mission package is designed to provide fleet protection from 
small boats and other asymmetrical threats. Other than field protection, the SUW mission 
package allows the ship to provide operational security in interdiction missions against 
terrorist suspects and high-seas pirates, and also provide defense against shore attacks 
while operating in the littorals. The SUW mission package augments the core LCS 
sensors and weapons capabilities with guns, missiles, and aviation systems, enhancing the 
safety of sailors operating the LCS (Office of Corporate Communication [SEA 00D], 
Naval Sea Systems Command, 2011). The baseline SUW mission package includes: 
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Mission Module Features 
Gun - MK 46 MOD (X) Gun Weapon System with MK 44 MOD 2 
30mm Automatic Cannon 
- Uses all Navy qualified 30mm and 173mm ammunition 
- 400 rounds in turret 
- Two ready service magazines with 240 rounds each 
- Three shipping containers 
Surface-to-
Surface Missile 
- Surface-to-surface missiles capable of engaging fast-moving 
small-boat threats 
- Launcher systems with self-contained technical fire control 
- Hatch system / support structure / module service panels 
- Gas management system 




- MK 299 MOD 2 launchers with 8 HellFire missiles 
- GAU21 .50 caliber machine gun 
- M240 7.62mm machine gun 
- Two support containers 
- Vertical-takeoff, unmanned, aerial vehicle (2) 
- One support container 
Maritime 
Security 
- Two 11m rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) with cradles and 
parts 
- Two berthing modules with gear storage 
- One head and shower module 
- Visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) gear 
- Boarding teams 
MP Application 
Software 
- Mission-specific application software that supports the MP in 
planning and executing SUW missions. 
Table 3.   SUW Mission Package (From Office of Corporate Communication [SEA 00D], 
Naval Sea Systems Command, 2011) 
4. Concept of operations 
Sea Power 21 (Clark, 2002) emphasizes the building of decisive warfighting 
capabilities around three concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. LCS will play 
an integral role in Sea Power 21, especially in Sea Shield, contributing its ability to 
respond quickly, operate in littoral areas, and conduct focused missions with its suite of 
mission packages. The Sea Power concepts are summarized as follows: 
Sea Strike – offers expanded power projection that employs networked sensors, 
combat systems, and warriors to amplify the offensive impact of sea-based forces; 
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Sea Shield – global defensive assurance produced by extended homeland defense, 
sustained access to littorals, and the projection of defensive power deep overland; 
Sea Basing – enhanced operational independence and support for joint forces 




Figure 5.   LCS Concept of Operations (From Good, 2007) 
As seen in Figure 5, the LCS will constantly be deployed throughout a 
continuum of operations as part of a distributed force, networked to off-board sensors and 
power-projection elements, e.g., CSG/ESG. There are two major categories of missions: 
Focused and Continuing Missions. For Focused Missions, the LCS employs mission 
packages tailored to perform specific missions, e.g., SUW, MCM and ASW. The LCS 
deploys as part of a distributed force, where groups of ships may be discretely 
configured, so that more than one type of mission can by conducted by the force. In 
Continuing Missions, the LCS will always self-defend, conduct intelligence, surveillance, 
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and reconnaissance (ISR), deliver personnel and material, perform maritime-interception 
operations, Sea Line of Communications (SLOC) patrols, conduct information warfare, 
and participate heavily in force protection (Navy Warfare Development Command, 
2003). These missions are made possible by the LCS’s wide suite of sensory, command 
and control, and weapons capabilities.  
The employment of the LCS depends largely on the number of available units, the 
specific scenarios of different theaters, the requirements of the global naval concept of 
operations (Mullen, 2003), and other issues. There are three basic employment methods 
for the LCS: 
a. Integrated with CSG/ESG 
The LCS, with tailored mission configurations, would be deployed 
together with a CSG/ESG, providing vanguard scouting, pouncing support, and other 
tasking, especially in littoral areas. 
b. Divisions Operations 
An LCS force would be deployed forward to maintain a continuous 
presence in theaters of operations. This force will use its speed to be the first to reach the 
theaters and build situational awareness in the littoral in anticipation of other operations. 
The force will then integrate with joint task-force assets and continue operations. 
c. Limited Independent Operations 
A single forward-deployed LCS would response quickly and conduct a 
wide range of missions in a low-threat environment, e.g., SOF support, logistics, medical, 
HA/DR operations. 
The LCS should not be sought for multi-mission capabilities, but should be used 
more as a focused-mission platform, less capable of handling simultaneous missions. 
However, when deploying an LCS as part of a squadron, the combatant commander can 
choose to equip multiple LCS platforms with a mix of mission packages for operational 
success across a broad range of challenges associated with littoral warfare.  
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B. U.S. NAVY HA/DR OPERATIONS 
On January 12, 2010, at 4:53 p.m Eastern Standard Time, a 7.0 magnitude 
earthquake struck Haiti (see Figure 6). The devastating earthquake killed approximately 
220,000 people, injured 300,000, damaged 188,383 houses, destroyed 105,000 houses 
and left behind 19 million cubic meters of rubble and debris in Port au Prince (Disasters 
Emergency Committee). A majority of air- and sea-transport facilities were damaged and 
declared inoperable. After the earthquake, at least fifty-two aftershocks measuring 4.5 or 
greater were recorded. The President of Haiti declared a national emergency and 
requested immediate assistance from the United States and international community 
(DiOrio, 2010). 
 
Figure 6.   Earthquake Epicenter (From DiOrio, 2010) 
The U.S. military responded quickly to the request. The U.S. Coast Guard had 
two cutters near Port au Prince at the time of the quake, and these were joined by four 
more to conduct an initial damage assessment. Two MC-130s began the distribution of 
food and water on Day 1. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) sent in 6,000 airmen, including a 
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Kansas Air Guard engineering squadron to break the logjam at the airport. The Navy 
mustered thirty-three ships, including Coast Guard vessels, the carrier USS Carl Vinson, 
the hospital ship USNS Comfort, the cruiser USS Bunker Hill, two Amphibious-
Readiness Groups (ARGs)—LHD-5 USS Bataan and LHA-4 USS Nassau, and their 
support ships—two Marine Expeditionary Units (the 22nd and 24th), Navy Expeditionary 
Combat Command (NECC) personnel, and a Port-Security Unit (PSU). Three thousand 
U.S. soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division (Global Response Force) from Fort Bragg 
were deployed to establish a base for distribution of food and water. Within the first week 
after the earthquake, the U.S. had approximately 17,000 military personnel in and around 
Haiti for HA/DR operations (DiOrio, 2010).   
This example shows the many complexities in responding to HA/DR requests, 
especially due to the unpredictable nature of the frequency, extent of damage, and type of 
disaster. The difficulties are compounded by the dynamic nature of the deployment of 
U.S. forces and the increasing number of disasters reported each year (see Figure 7). 
HA/DR operations are increasingly common and have become one of the leading other-
than-war (OTW) missions of the U.S Navy. From 1970 through 2000, U.S forces were 
involved in 366 humanitarian missions, a number made more significant when compared 
to the twenty-two combat-related missions during the same period (Cobble, Gaffney, & 
Gorenburg). The interest in contributing actively in HA/DR operations can best be seen 
in the Navy’s new “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” where the Navy 
will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and 
multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises 
(Department of Navy (DoN), 2007). In 2012, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Jonathan Greenert, emphasized the unwavering support of the U.S Navy for HA/DR 
operations. 
Some of our friends and international partners have expressed concern that 
budget reductions will affect the fleet’s ability to conduct humanitarian 
assistance missions. We have a new strategy and some budget changes, 
but we will continue to answer the call when a humanitarian need arises or 
natural disaster strikes. Our forward presence allowed us to rapidly 
respond to tsunamis in Indonesia and Japan, earthquakes in Haiti, or 
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floods in Pakistan. Because they operate forward and are ready, our 
deployed ships and sailors help save lives in the critical first days after a 
disaster. (Greenert, 2012) 
 
Figure 7.   Natural Disasters Trend, 1975 – 2011 (From EM-DAT, 2011) 
Regardless of the type of disaster, there are common traits in every major 









High number of deaths and injuries 
High number of missing persons 
Destruction of buildings and homes 
Destruction of transportation infrastructure such as airports, 
seaports, roads, and railways 
Increased demand for basic necessities, such as food, water, 
shelter 
Increased demand for medical personnel, medical facilities, and 
medicine 
High amount of debris 
Table 4.   Disaster Traits 
Military support in HA/DR operations is intended to be of short duration i.e., 
during the crisis stage. Once a situation has stabilized, the United Nations (UN), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the host nation should assume the functions 
conducted by the military (Department Of The Navy, 2005). However, military support is 
critical in the crisis stage to stabilize the situation, deliver logistics supplies, provide 
healthcare services, enforce security and peace, and conduct search and rescue. The need 
for speed in reaching the disaster area is therefore of utmost importance. During 
Operation Unified, there was a concerted effort by the U.S. Navy to be as forward as 
possible and reach out to Haiti in the shortest possible time.  
 
“Since… the first few hours and days are absolutely critical to saving lives 
and avoiding even greater tragedy, I have directed my teams to be as 
forward-leaning as possible in getting the help on the ground and 
coordinating with our international partners as well.” President Obama 
Press conference 13 Jan (Obama, 2010). 
 
The Navy has been the leading force in HA/DR efforts, mainly because it owns 
multiple assets that have unique capabilities in providing relief efforts. The dispersion of 
assets across the globe ensures that Navy is always within reach of any area requiring 
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help. The Navy will, however, need to understand what functions are required and which 
assets will be most efficient and effective in a specific disaster. To improve its efforts, the 
Navy will need to incorporate new capabilities, not only in warfighting operations, but 
also in HA/DR operations.    
The Navy has identified HA/DR as a core capability and further divided it into 
proactive and reactive HA/DR. While both concepts serves the same aim of providing 
relief, assistance, and support, proactive HA/DR tends towards the humanitarian 
assistance (HA) part by employing globally distributed, mission-tailored naval forces to 
address ally and partner needs that may not be directly related to national security, but 
reflect the values and desires of the American people to render aid and reduce suffering. 
Reactive HA/DR undertakes similar activities, but the often extreme circumstances and 
severe risks to the population that characterize such events demand an immediate 
response that can only be provided by expeditionary naval forces trained and proficient in 
diverse crisis-response operations (Department of Navy (DoN), 2010). 
 
C. HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS 
Disaster management consists of many processes with several stages. Disaster-
relief operations can be divided into three main phases: preparation (activities before the 
disaster occurs), immediate response (actions taken instantly), and reconstruction (actions 
in the aftermath) (Kovacs & Spens, 2007). The resources and skills required for each 
phase differ, and a clear understanding of the different phases enables planners to prepare 
for HA/DR operations in the event of disaster.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Phases of disaster-relief operations (From Kovacs & Spens, 2007) 
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1. Preparation phase 
The preparation phase describes the activities that can be done prior to a disaster 
that may alleviate the effects of the disaster on people and infrastructure. These activities 
can be further segregated into two main areas: the preparedness of people living in 
disaster-prone regions and the preparedness of aid agencies. 
Some regions may be more prone to natural disasters than others, such as those 
close to an active volcano, hurricane-prone region, or fault line. For such regions, 
measures can be taken to limit the effects of a disaster. Evacuation plans can be 
developed and evacuation training can be conducted to familiarize people. Early warning 
systems can provide notice of impending disaster, e.g., volcanoes’ eruptions and 
incoming hurricanes, so that evacuation-related measures can be taken early to reduce the 
extent of the damage. Important logistics items such as water, food, medicine, blankets, 
and tents can be stocked at safe locations to be distributed in time of need. 
The preparedness of aid agencies helps them achieve efficiency and effectiveness 
of operations in the immediate-response and reconstruction phases. Strategic plans can be 
developed for disasters before they occur to ensure the smooth implementation of relief-
aid operations. Stocking up on logistics items and pre-purchasing agreements with 
suppliers ensures the continuous flow of critical aid. Coordinating many agencies can 
prove to be challenging, especially when they have their own operating structures. 
Coordination plans can be prepared during the preparation phase, as aid agencies develop 
collaborative plans through organizations such as the United Nations Joint Logistics 
Center (UNJLC) (Kovacs & Spens, 2007).   
The challenge to U.S. naval forces is to enhance their ability to conduct HA/DR 
without degrading their capability and proficiency in conducting more traditional naval 
missions. Given their forward presence, inherent mobility, and flexible capabilities, U.S. 
naval forces are frequently the “force of choice” for such missions. However, the 
demands of emergent, reactive HA/DR can affect readiness, logistical sustainment, and 
operational dwell, and often require contingency funding to reset the units involved 
(Department of Navy (DoN), 2010). 
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2. Immediate Response phase 
The emergency plans of aid agencies are put in place once a disaster strikes. 
However, no matter how detailed or prepared an aid agency may be, the unpredictable 
nature of disasters and the extent of the damage can create obstacles. The immediate 
response to any major disaster is always to deliver supplies to the region, and supply 
chains need to be deployed even with very limited information on the situation. The main 
problems in the immediate-response phase lie in the coordination of supplies, the 
unpredictability of demand, and the last-mile problem of transporting necessary items to 
victims (Kovacs & Spens, 2007). Infrastructure almost always poses the greatest 
challenge in the provision of relief aid in this phase. The existence of entry points into the 
country, e.g., ports and airports, and the availability of roads and vehicles are vital to 
delivering supplies to and within the disaster region.  
3. Reconstruction phase 
The reconstruction phase helps providing long-term relief aid to victims in a 
disaster region. Activities include the fixing of damaged homes, supplying survival kits, 
constructing new homes, and fixing damaged roads. The main aim is to rebuild the region 
back to what it was before the disaster and help the victims regain their original way of 
living. Unfortunately, funding is often focused on short-term disaster relief, neglecting 




III. A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
A. METHODOLOGY 
A Systems Engineering approach is adopted to analyze the feasibility of 
employing LCSs in HA/DR operations. An initial problem definition is formulated, in 
which the capability need is identified. The capability need in this sense might not refer 
to a capability gap, but may point to an area of improvement in conducting HA/DR 
operations and deployment. Major stakeholders and their primary needs are identified. A 
functional decomposition and mission requirements based on the capability need and 
stakeholder views are developed. The functional decomposition and mission 
requirements are used to study the feasibility of the LCS in HA/DR operations, and also 
shape the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) in the following chapter. The type of 
logistical mission package required in meeting the requirements for HA/DR operations is 
also derived in the following chapter.  
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
HA/DR operations have been identified as a core competency in the Navy. The 
recent increase in disasters occurrence has placed HA/DR at the top of OTW operations. 
The Navy typically provides relief aid in the preparation and immediate response phase 
of disaster-relief operations. Relief-aid supplies are stocked up in strategic locations, e.g., 
selected ships and ports, to facilitate the delivering of supplies to disaster regions. When a 
disaster strikes, the Navy sizes up nearby ships and sends them to the region as soon as 
possible to provide an initial provision of supplies and assess the situation, meanwhile 
preparing other ships to deliver more logistics items and support to the area. Besides 
delivering supplies, the Navy conducts other relief-aid operations, e.g., port surveys, 
police and security services, and medical aid, and organizes distribution efforts.   
The highlight of HA/DR operations in the immediate response phase is the 
delivery of items such as food, water, and medical supplies. Big ships like Aircraft 
Carriers and Amphibious ships have been the top choice in HA/DR operations, due to 
their large capacity for cargo and personnel. The medical facilities aboard such ships are 
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also more complete and offer a wider range of medical care. The fuel capacity of these 
ships is also larger, allowing them to have higher endurance, and travel farther, without 
refueling. Due to their suitability for HA/DR operations, their crews are trained 
specifically for such missions.   
An example is the Essex Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), which consists of 
the forward-deployed, amphibious-assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2), and the dock-
landing ships USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), USS Germantown (LSD 42) and USS 
Tortuga (LSD 46). The Essex ARG was deployed to provide HA/DR support to Japan 
after the country was hit by an 8.9 magnitude earthquake and ensuing tsunami in March 
2011. The ship crews were trained for HA/DR operations and the ships were equipped 
with CH-53 Sea Stallion and CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters, which can move more than 
260,000 pounds of cargo and 860 passengers per day. The Essex ARG can also make use 
of amphibious craft, e.g., landing craft, air cushion (LCAC), and landing craft utilities 
(LCUs), to transport personnel and cargo to shore. Furthermore, the Essex’ medical 
department can expand into a 600-bed hospital with a 14-bed intensive care unit and 46-
bed inpatient ward. The ship’s medical facilities include six operating rooms, three triage 
stations, X-ray facilities, a blood bank, and a laboratory (Ramsaran, 2011).  
Speed is of the essence in any rescue or HA/DR mission. In December 2007, the 
USS Ronald Reagan received a distress call from the Dawn Princess cruise ship off the 
coast of Baja California: a fourteen-year-old girl had a ruptured appendix. The Ronald 
Reagan, which was on maneuvers about 500 miles from the Dawn Princess, answered 
the distress call, sped towards the cruise ship, and got close enough to launch a 
helicopter. The girl was airlifted back to the ship and medical assistance was rendered, 
saving her life (Hoffman, 2007). Should the Ronald Reagan not have gotten to the cruise 
ship in time, the girl might not have survived. Similarly, the faster the U.S. Navy can get 
to a disaster area, the faster it can render relief aid, which may help save many lives. 
Amphibious ships, such as the Essex ARG, though suitable for HA/DR operations, are 
relatively slow, with speeds in the 20-knots region. Cruisers and Destroyers are smaller 
ships with greater speed. However, they lack sufficient cargo capacity and hence have 
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very limited ability to deliver relief-aid supplies. In terms of size, carrying capacity, and 
speed, Aircraft Carriers may be the best choice.   
The draft of a vessel refers to the distance between the vessel’s waterline and the 
lowest point of the vessel, usually the keel (Bruno). Draft determines the minimum depth 
of water a ship requires to safely navigate and is a significant factor limiting navigable 
waterways, shallow coastal waters, and reefs, especially for large ships. The draft of a 
ship also determines its ability to dock in port, especially ports in shallow waters. Large 
ships have larger drafts, and hence limitations in maneuvering in shallow waters. The 
USS Essex (LHD 2) has a draft of 26.6 ft. (IHS Jane's, 2011), meaning that it can 
maneuver only in waters with depths of more than 26.6 ft. The common concept of 
operations for large ships such as Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious ships is to dock in 
deeper waters and use secondary mode of transportation, usually helicopters and smaller 
crafts, e.g., LCACs and LCUs, to transport cargo and personnel to shore. The round trips 
made under the secondary mode of transportation require many resources, such as the 
time and personnel used for loading and unloading, as well as the movement to and from 
the ship and shore. This increases the lead-time needed to deliver supplies and personnel 
and decreases the efficiency of HA/DR operations.  
For a more efficient and effective manner of conducting HA/DR operations, the 
U.S. Navy needs to look into other available means, concepts of operations, and 
platforms.  
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
When a disaster strikes, two groups are most affected: those who require help and 
those who provide help. The group that requires help is mainly residents of the region, 
i.e., disaster victims and the host-nation government. The group that provides help is 
those who stand up in the aftermath to provide relief aid, i.e., humanitarian actors. These 
may include the military and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this 
discussion, the military specifically refers to the U.S. Navy. The table below summarizes 
the primary stakeholders and their primary needs. 
 
 28 
Stakeholder Primary needs 
Disaster victims - To stay alive 
- To look for the missing  
Host-nation 
government 
- To provide for disaster victims 
- To rebuild infrastructure 
- To assess extent of damage and request help from 
international bodies 
NGOs - To provide relief and assistance to disaster victims 
- To help victims survive the ordeal in the long run 
U.S. Military (Navy) - To provide immediate relief and assistance to disaster 
victims 
- To coordinate HA/DR efforts 
- To conduct security operations 
Table 5.   Stakeholders’ primary needs 
Natural and man-made disasters lead to human suffering and create needs that the 
victims cannot alleviate without assistance. The victims’ primary need is to stay alive. In 
the aftermath of a disaster, victims may find themselves with destroyed homes, broken 
families, and no access to basic necessities. There is uncertainty as to whether the disaster 
is over yet (e.g., there may be aftershocks) and if they will be able to receive help from 
their government. In the period immediately after a disaster, the victims need no more 
than the necessities to survive, i.e., food, water, medicine, shelter, and nutrition. The 
other immediate need is to find missing family and friends. 
Though faced with the same predicament, the host-nation government must 
endeavor to help its citizens survive. Beyond simply providing citizens with logistical 
supplies, the government needs to rebuild basic infrastructure such as medical facilities 
and roads. Medical facilities should be the main priority. Transportation facilities must be 
rebuilt to enable delivery from external sources, via seaports and airports, and from 
internal sources, via roads and railways. More importantly, the government needs to 
conduct an initial assessment of the damage, size up its deficiencies, and request relief aid 
from the international community.    
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When a disaster strikes, a variety of international organizations such as NGOs 
(several are listed in the table below) play an important role in disaster response. They 
participate in all three phases of relief operations (Kovacs & Spens, 2007), especially the 
first and third. The NGOs’ aim is typically to provide relief and assistance to victims and 
help them survive in the long run. Because they are usually structured and organized to 
provide long-term assistance, they typically carry with them more than first-aid response 
kits.   
 
S/N Organization Type of aid 
1 World Food Program (WFP) Logistics, food, emergency 
telecommunications 
2 International Federation of Red 
Cross 
Shelter, non-food items 
3 UNICEF Water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, 
education 
4 Pan American Health 
Organization / World Health 
Organization 
Health 
5 United Nations Development 
Program 
Early recovery 
6 International Organization for 
Migration 
Camp coordination and management 
7 Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 
Protection 
8 Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations 
Agriculture 
Table 6.    List of NGOs (From Roux, 2011)  
HA/DR operations are not new to the Navy, whose ships are frequently the first to 
arrive at a disaster to provide aid. However, unless trained and equipped for a specific 
kind of disaster, all they can bring is first-aid response, and rarely more. Navy ships are 
typically involved in only the first two phases of disaster relief (Kovacs & Spens, 2007). 
The Navy’s main aim in HA/DR operations is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or 
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man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as pain, hunger, or privation that 
might threaten life or property. Some activities include providing necessities and medical 
assistance, establishing communications, coordinating efforts among NGOs and the 
military and providing security. The Navy also guards supplies and HA/DR personnel 
against looters. 
D. BOUNDARY 
The disaster relief operations phases described by Kovacs and Spens form the 
boundary for this Systems Engineering study. Specifically, the HA/DR operations that 
are conducted or required from the U.S. Navy are studied in details, across the disaster 
relief phases. The U.S. Navy is most active in the immediate response phase, by 
providing immediate relief aid to the disaster victims in the shortest possible time. Prior 
to that, the U.S. Navy prepares itself to conduct HA/DR operations, by stocking on relief 
aid supplies, and conducting HA/DR training to its Sailors. The following sections 
describe the functions and mission requirements for the HA/DR operations within the 
disaster relief operations phases. 
E. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
While the Navy participates in the preparation and immediate response phase, 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007), the reconstruction phase is the responsibility of the host-nation 
government, usually assisted by NGOs, which will remain in the host nation. After the 
disaster, the host-nation government will assess the damage and request international 
assistance. The U.S. DoD will generally receive a request for assistance and convert the 
request into military missions. Military forces, e.g., Navy ships, soldiers, etc., are then 
deployed to the region for HA/DR operations. 
The functional decomposition in Figure 9 encompasses the entire spectrum of 
HA/DR operations, which might not necessarily be accomplished by the Navy alone. 
Understanding the functional decomposition of HA/DR operations will allow a better 
understanding of mission requirements, and therefore the suitability of Navy ships, 




Figure 9.   HA/DR Functional Decomposition  
The functions required are described in detail in the following section. 
F1.1 To respond 
The request for assistance will be received by the DoD and translated into 
naval missions. Ships will be deployed to conduct HA/DR operations, sailing to the host 
nation (to move) and linking up with local authorities to commence operations (to link 
up).   
F1.2 To supply 
One of the most critical tasks in HA/DR operations is the provision of 
logistical supplies, for example, food, water, shelter, and medicine, to disaster victims. 
Supplies must be loadable on ships and unloadable for transportation and distribution (to 
load/unload). There must also be sufficient storage space on ship and at depots ashore (to 
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store). Transportation assets must be able to move the aid to centers (to transport) where 
they will be distributed to victims (to distribute).  
F1.3 To coordinate 
DoD has been at the forefront of recent HA/DR operations and is 
increasingly taking the lead. With the huge influx of HA/DR response by both military 
and non-military organizations, there may be confusion on the ground as to who’s in 
charge (DiOrio, 2010), causing undesirable delays. Hence, a vital function is coordination 
of the various HA/DR operations carried out by different agencies. For effective 
coordination, a good plan must be in place (to plan). A good plan depends on the 
accuracy of the information in the plan. In the chaotic environment right after a disaster, 
an all-encompassing global picture of the situation is essential to match available 
resources to needs. Information such as the number and location of victims, already 
available humanitarian resources, required humanitarian resources, and access to 
transportation is required for HA/DR operations planning (Roux, 2011). The ability to 
access and collect this information (to sense) is thus required to conduct planning for 
HA/DR operations. Proper assignment of tasks must be carried out according to plan, so 
that each agency is clear about its role (to assign). Lack of assignment may lead to 
duplication of effort, waste of limited resources, and missed opportunities to assist 
victims (Roux, 2011).    
F1.4 To secure 
The situation after a disaster is usually chaotic. Supply shortages may lead 
to increased crime, particularly looting and violence. For example, in Haiti, delays in 
relief distribution led to angry appeals from aid workers and survivors. Looting and 
violence were sporadic and a police presence was virtually nonexistent (DiOrio, 2010). 
The arrival of relief agencies may bring about a frenzied rush for supplies. A good 
security plan must be put in place to provide a safe and secure environment for 
humanitarian personnel, to benefit them and the victims (Roux, 2011). The plan is to 
protect the safety of HA/DR personnel (to protect) and guard supplies from looters (to 
guard) (Cohen, Quilenderino, Bubulka, & Paulo). 
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F1.5 To search and rescue 
Another critical task of HA/DR operations is to provide search and rescue 
and medical aid. High numbers of deaths and injuries, missing persons, and destroyed 
infrastructure are characteristic of disasters. Thus, the need to save victims is top priority. 
Search missions must be conducted for victims swept away or trapped in debris (to 
search). The injured must be evacuated quickly to medical facilities, whether makeshift 
hospitals, surgical facilities aboard ships, or surviving hospitals (to evacuate), for 
immediate aid (to medicate). 
F1.6 To communicate 
The destruction of infrastructure may include destruction of 
communications infrastructure. Communication is required to request help (to request) 
and disseminate important information (to disseminate). A common communications 
system must be put in place, e.g., a website dedicated to the mission or a radio frequency 
that all agencies can use to transmit and receive data. Establishing a common mode of 
communication ensures that relevant and up-to-date information such as objectives, 
maps, and resources can be disseminated quickly.  
F1.7 To restore 
The restoration of the host nation to its original state is the responsibility 
of the local government and is an uphill task, depending on the amount of destruction and 
debris. This task often takes a long time. As an immediate response to the disaster, aid 
agencies must clear debris in the area of operations, e.g., seaports and airports, (to clear) 
and build vital infrastructure such as hospitals, main supply routes, and power 
infrastructure (to build) in order for HA/DR operations to proceed. 
F. U.S. NAVY MISSION REQUIREMENTS  
In 2011, Greenfield and Ingram conducted a thesis study and investigated the 
response of the U.S. Navy and the Military Sealift command to different types of natural 
disasters and identified the types of assets deployed as well as the dwell times for those 
assets. Using the recent history of the U.S. Navy humanitarian assistance and disaster 
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relief operations, Greenfield and Ingram explore opportunities to shape the fleet force 
structure to adapt to the increased mission importance of HA/DR operations. The study 
also analyzed disaster characteristics and the Navy platform capabilities, to determine 
which assets are better suited for mission requirements brought on by disasters. 
Greenfield and Ingram came up a list of the most common HA/DR mission requests 
received by Navy and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) shown in Figure 10. 
(Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). The list of missions was created by connecting common 
disaster traits with Navy and MSC capabilities.  
 
Figure 10.   Standard HA/DR Mission Request (From Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
1. Mission Requirements 
The functional allocations from previous section translate to a set of basic HA/DR 
mission requirements that the Navy will need to conduct. As mentioned, the Navy will 
not fulfill all the HA/DR functions alone. Some of the tasks are conducted with the host 
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nation or NGOs. Other functions will either be tasked to the host nation or the NGOs. 
Figure 11 shows the functions, and who conducts them. The Navy will only provide 
HA/DR operations in the form of immediate relief aid, particularly to supply relief aid, 
co-ordinate relief aid efforts and also to provide security for HA/DR operations for the 
humanitarian actors.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Functions of U.S Navy 
The mission-request list from Greenfield and Ingram was used as a reference 
mission list and expanded to include mission requirements that were not formulated from 
the functional decomposition. Table 7 provides a list of the HA/DR mission requirements 
that the Navy will receive. The mission requirements are then translated to a set of 
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classification metrics for the assessment of the suitability of Navy ships, particularly 
LCSs, in this study of HA/DR operations. 
 
Mission Requirements Mapping to functions 
Aircraft support capability To transport 
Amphibious Landing Craft support To transport 












Dry goods To store 
Refrigerated goods To store 
Fresh water To store 
Roll On Roll Off (RORO) To transport 
Fuel To store 
Self-Sufficiency To move 
Personnel transfer To link up 
Fresh water production capability To store 
Personnel support for cleanup and 
recovery efforts 
To clear 
Berthing capability To medicate 
Medical support To medicate 
Transit speed To move 
Hydrographic survey To sense 
Salvage operations To clear 
Towing capability To clear 
Crane capability To load/unload 






Self-defense capability (ship) To protect 
To guard 
Self-defense capability (personnel) To protect 
To guard 
Table 7.   Mission Requirements (After Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
2. Mission Requirement Metrics 
A set of classification metrics is developed from the mission requirements to 
provide a way to assess a ship’s ability to conduct HA/DR operations and to compare 
ships of different types and capabilities with respect to HA/DR. The link between mission 
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requirements and ship capability is made with a three-step classification, shown in Table 
8. The set of classification metrics is meant to indicate if a ship has the ability to conduct 
a specific mission and does not quantify the capability of the ship to do so, e.g., 30% 
capable of conducting a specific mission. The ship’s capability is thus assigned one of 
three classification symbols, based on an ordinal scale of little/no capability, some 
capability, and very capable. The assessment of the ship was conducted by understanding 
the ships’ capability and rating the capability with accordance to the classification. 
 
Classification symbol Classification description 
 
Ship has little/no capability to conduct the specific mission. 
 
Ship has some capability to conduct the specific mission.  
 
Ship is very capable of conducting the specific mission. 
Table 8.   Classification scale 









No helo capability, unable to support helicopter operations 
 
Single helos on ship, able to support some helicopter operations 
 






No ability to support amphibious landing craft 
 
Some ability to support amphibious landing craft 
 
Able to store and support amphibious landing craft 
 
Search and Rescue  
No helo capabilities, unable to conduct SAR mission  
 
Single helo, limited capability to conduct SAR mission 
 

















Some ability to store supplies beyond ship’s use 











No ability to transfer personnel 
 
Limited ability to transfer personnel (up to 15) 
 





No ability to produce and transfer fresh water beyond ship’s usage 
 
Some ability to produce and transfer water beyond ship’s usage of up to 
2000 gallons per day 
 
Ability to produce and transfer water beyond ship’s usage of up more 
than 5000 gallons per day 
Personnel support for 
cleanup and recovery 
efforts 
 
Low crew number to support HA/DR operations (< 50 personnel) 
 
Medium size crew to support HA/DR operations (51–200 personnel) 
 
Large crew to support HA/DR operations (> 200 personnel) 
 
Berthing capability  
Little to no excess berthing (< 30 racks) 
 
Some excess berthing (31–50 racks) 
 
Larger number of excess berthing (> 50 racks) 
 
Medical support  
No ability to conduct impatient medical treatments 
 
Some medical support available, ability to support minor medical 
procedures 
 
Medical support available, ability to perform surgeries and hold patients 
 
Transit speed  
0 – 18 knots max speed 
 




> 24 knots max speed 
 
Hydrographic survey  
No ability to conduct hydrographic survey 
 
Some ability to conduct hydrographic survey 
 
Ability to conduct hydrographic survey 
 
Salvage operations  
No ability to conduct salvage  
 
Some ability to conduct salvage in shallow waters 
 
Ability to conduct salvage, e.g., heavy lift and deep-water salvage 
operations 
 
Towing capability  
No ability to conduct towing operations 
 
Some ability to conduct towing operations 
 
Ability to conduct towing operations, e.g., push, pull, or alongside towing 
operations 
 
Crane capability  
No ability to conduct crane operations 
 
Some ability to conduct light crane operations 
 






No ability to conduct planning and communication operations 
 
Basic planning and communications facilities available 
 
Fully equipped planning and communications facilities available 
Self-defense 
capability (ship)  
No or little ability for self-defense in littoral regions 
 
Some capability of self-defense in littoral regions 
 






No or little ability for personnel self-defense on land 
 
Some capability for personnel self-defense on land 
 
Capable for self-defense or combat operations on land 
Table 9.   Mission Requirements (After Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
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IV. LCS FEASIBILITY IN HA/DR OPERATIONS 
A. FEASBILITY STUDY 
The feasibility of LCS in conducting HA/DR operations is studied in using the 
mission requirements in the following table. Aircraft Carriers (CVN Nimitz) (IHS Jane's, 
2012c) and Amphibious ships (Land Ship Dock (LSD) and Landing Platform Dock 
(LPD) (Jane's, 2011)) are also studied using the same requirements, to compare between 
the ships. Both LCS Freedom and Independence class are included in the study. Only the 
basic LCS seaframe with basic components, e.g., helicopter support, sensor capabilities 
are considered in the study. Table 10 highlights the effectiveness of the Aircraft Carriers, 
Amphibious ships and LCS in their ability to conduct HA/DR operations. 
 
 
Table 10.   Feasibility Study (From Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
The over-arching mission of the U.S. Navy is to provide large amount of relief aid 
supplies to the disaster victims in the shortest possible time, and the capability of U.S. 
Navy to conduct HA/DR operations is best measured by the ability of the ships to deliver 
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the supplies. In summary, the ship’s ability to carry and transfer cargo, its speed, and its 
ability to provide personnel and medical support is vital in HA/DR operations. The 
feasibility study table lays out an easy-to-understand matrix of the comparison of the 
Aircraft Carriers, Amphibious ship and LCS’ ability to conduct HA/DR operations. It can 
be observed from the feasibility study table that Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious ships 
excel in the ability to conduct HA/DR operations. The Amphibious ships are able to 
conduct aircraft support, landing craft support, search and rescue operations, quick 
personnel transfers and medical support. The Aircraft Carriers allows for the storage of 
large amounts of cargo, personnel transfer and support, medical support and a high transit 
speed. 
In comparison with the Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious ships, the LCS with its 
current set of mission packages seems to be slightly lacking in the ability to conduct 
HA/DR operations. The following sections describe the advantages and shortcomings of 
the LCS in HA/DR operations  
1. Advantages 
The main advantage of the LCS in conducting HA/DR operations is its high sprint 
speed. Its sprint speed of 40+ knots enables it to get to the disaster region much faster 
than the Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious ships. In conducting HA/DR operations, 
providing immediate relief aid is of utmost essence, and hence the faster the ship, the 
better the ability of the ship to deliver relief aid supplies. The faster the ship arrives at the 
disaster region, the faster the supplies and medication aid gets delivered, and the higher 
the chances that more disaster victims can get saved. 
Unlike big ships like the Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships, the LCS has a 
much shallow draft and thus has much more maneuverability in shallow waters, including 
the ability to dock at port with shallow waters. The current doctrine for Aircraft Carriers 
and Amphibious ships is to dock in deeper waters off the port, and to transport cargo and 
personnel via helicopters or landing crafts. The transportation of cargo and personnel via 
secondary means takes up a lot of resources, e.g., time and manpower. On the contrary, 
LCS, having a much shallow draft is able to dock at ports, and deliver cargo and 
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personnel straight to the disaster region. The unloading of cargo and personnel transfer 
will take much less time, and involves less logistics. 
The LCS carries with it a full suite of sensors, such as the VTUAVs and OASIS. 
The LCS can deploy these sensors prior to reaching the disaster region, for a 
reconnaissance mission, and gain a better picture of the situation before reaching the port. 
This enables the commander to make plans for the organization of the HA/DR operations, 
once the ship has docked.  
2. Shortcomings 
The LCS has limited capacity to carry cargo and personnel. The LCS was 
designed to be combatant ship, and hence not meant to have a large cargo hold for the 
storage of cargo. Any available cargo space was meant to store necessities for the 
sustainment of the ship crew for sustained operations. This made it hard for the LCS to 
carry relief aid supplies for HA/DR operations. The LCS allows for a maximum of about 
100 berthing facilities for Sailors (Martin , 2010) to operate both the seaframe and the 
mission packages. This means that there will only be 100 Sailors available to conduct 
HA/DR operations, which include unloading relief aid supplies, clearing of debris at port, 
conducting search and rescue missions, and provide security. This amount of manpower 
will not be able to accomplish the tasks, and hence leads to the LCS being unable to carry 
out the full suite of HA/DR operations effectively. 
The LCS has limited medical support facilities onboard, and is not meant to cater 
to mass casualties or casualties suffering from severe injuries, e.g., requiring surgery.   
The only possible medical aid the LCS can offer could be the provision of limited 
quantities of medical supplies, and limited medical consultation, if there is a medical 
officer onboard the LCS. 
The LCS also has limited endurance when travelling at sprint speed. An 
Operation Research (OR) thesis by John P. Baggett (Baggett, 2008) analyzed the LCS 
fuel consumption and endurance, and concluded that the LCS will have a threshold 
endurance range of 1,000nm at a sprint speed of 40kts. This limited endurance means that 
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either the LCS has to travel at a slower speed to travel further, or there is a need for re-
fueling by the U.S. Navy Combat Logistics Force (CLF) in the midst of the journey.   
B. LCS IRREGULAR WARFARE MISSION PACKAGES 
The LCS may not be fully equipped and feasible for HA/DR operations with its 
current set of mission packages. The current three sets of mission packages focus on 
conducting surface warfare, anti-submarine and mine countermeasure missions 
effectively, but is far from ideal for HA/DR operations. A new mission package designed 
to equip the LCS with the HA/DR operations capability may enable the LCS to conduct 
HA/DR operations more effectively. 
The Naval Seas System Command is currently developing a new LCS mission 
package focusing on Irregular Warfare (IW) operations, of which capabilities will fall 
towards humanitarian assistance and disaster relief-types missions. One of the main 
additions that the IW mission package will bring onboard is the additional medical 
support capability to care for disaster victims.   Other than the IW mission package, the 
U.S. Navy is also developing a Maritime Security Mission (MSM) package. The 
combination of the MSM and IW mission packages will enable the LCS to be a vital tool 
in the U.S. Navy efforts to increase partner nation engagements around the world, 
especially in the Western Pacific (Munoz, 2012).  
1. IW mission package considerations 
A study on the possible equipment for the IW mission packages is conducted 
following the functional decomposition (Figure 9) and mission requirements (Table 7). 
The IW mission packages must allow the LCS to fulfill the functions required of the ship 
for HA/DR operations. Simply put, it must address the current deficiency of the LCS to 
conduct HA/DR operations. The following considerations must be taken into account for 
the design of the IW mission packages. 
a. Modularization 
Similar to the other mission packages, the IW mission package must also 
be modularized and be a ‘plug and play’ module for the LCS. Additionally, due to the 
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need for speed for HA/DR operations, it is essential that the installation of the IW 
mission package be as fast as possible, so that the LCS can quickly be installed with the 
IW mission package and embarks on the HA/DR operation.  
b. Standardization 
The range of equipment used for the IW mission package is desired to be 
the same as those from the other mission packages. This will help minimize logistical 
issues, such as maintenance and spares inventory. Having similar equipment also allows 
the changing of mission packages to be faster, since not all equipment will need to be 
unloaded and loaded. It is also cost efficient to share equipment due to savings in 
acquisition and Operations and Support (O&S) cost. 
c. Training  
Training has to be conducted to ensure that the LCS crews are able to 
operate the equipment in the IW mission packages. While this report does not study on 
the manpower requirement, it is unlikely that a separate crew be formed specifically for 
the IW mission package due to manpower shortages. As such, it is imperative that all 
LCS seaframe and the three mission package crews are able to operate the IW mission 
package.   
2. IW mission package  
 A possible suite of equipment and the functions they fulfill is described in 












- Berthing containers with multiple racks 
 
Cargo capacity - Storage containers 
- Refrigerated containers 
- Fuel containers 
- Water purification unit 
Medical Support - Surgical Container equipped with triage station, X-rays 
facilities, surgical facilities and blood bank 
- Medical personnel, e.g., doctors, surgeons and nurses. 
Material 
Handling 
- Fixed cranes 
- Portable cranes 
- Forklifts 
- Trolleys 
- Support containers 
Search and 
Rescue 
- MH-60S helicopter 
- Life detecting devices, e.g., LifeLocator® III+ (Geophysical 
Survey Systems, Inc) 
Self Defense  - VBSS Gear 
Table 11.   IW mission package 
a. Personnel Berthing and Support 
More personnel support is achievable by using berthing containers to 
provide for berthing facilities on top of those already available on the LCSs. The berthing 
containers will provide for basic shelter and sleeping facilities for the crew. For other 
facilities, e.g., toilet, bathing and messing facilities, the crew will use those that are 
already built on the ship. 
b. Cargo Capacity 
Replacing battle essential equipment, e.g., sensors, ALMD and AMNS 
with storage containers can increase the cargo capacity of the ship. The storage containers 
may include the following equipment. 
• Storage container – The storage container will be used for the carrying 
large amounts of relief aid supplies, e.g., bottled water, food, blankets and 
first aid equipment. 
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• Refrigerated container – Refrigerated container will be used for the 
storage of specific supplies, e.g., foodstuff and medicine. 
• Water purification unit – The water purification unit is used to purify 
water for the disaster victims. The purified water will augment the 
supplies of bottled water in the storage container. 
 
Figure 12.   Water purification unit (From Bolch, 2005) 
• Fuel containers – Fuel can be stored in containers to increase the 
endurance of the LCS. The fuel can also be provided to the host nation for 
their use. 
c. Medical Support 
Surgical containers may be installed on the LCS to enhance the medical 
capability of the ship in HA/DR operations. The surgical containers will come equipped 
with triage station, X-rays facilities, surgical facilities, blood bank and medical personnel, 
e.g., doctors, surgeons, medics and nurses. The surgical container will be able to augment 




Figure 13.   TransHospital’s Operating Room module ( From EADS North America, 
2007) 
d. Material Handling Capability 
Material handling equipment is vital for the loading and unloading of the 
containers and relief aid supplies at the port. Containers and relief aid supplies have to be 
unloaded at the port for storage and distribution, and material-handling equipment will 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the unloading operations. The equipment 
includes fixed and portable cranes, forklift and trolleys.  
e. Search and Rescue Capability 
The aftermath of a disaster usually brings about extensive damage to the 
area, leading to missing or stranded victims. Search and rescue capability will enhance 
the LCS crew to help search for missing people, and rescue stranded victims. Aerial 
support, especially helicopters is a great asset in search and rescue missions. The 
helicopter is able to fly over damaged areas searching for victims, rescue stranded 
victims, and transport supplies. Life detecting devices, e.g., LifeLocator® III+ 
(Geophysical Survey Systems, Inc) can be used to detect life signs like breathing and 
movement, and hence be used to search for trapped victims. 
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Figure 14.   LifeLocator® III+ (From Geophysical Survey Systems, Inc) 
f. Self Defense Capability 
The Navy is required to provide security to its own forces, as well as the 
relief aid supplies that are being delivered and stored at port against looters. Standard 
small caliber arms are sufficient as the main motive is to deter looters. The VBSS gear 
used in the surface warfare mission package can be used for this aspect of the HA/DR 
operations. The LCS seaframe self-defense capability is sufficient to deal with the 
defense of the ship. 
3. Feasibility Study of LCS with Irregular Warfare mission package 
A qualitative assessment on LCS with IW mission package is conducted with the 
same mission requirements. Table 12 highlights the effectiveness of the LCS with IW 
mission package in their ability to conduct HA/DR operations. With the inclusion of the 
IW mission package, the feasibility of LCS in performing HA/DR operations is 
improved, especially in areas of cargo capacity, personnel support, berthing and medical 
support. The IW mission package is able to mitigate the shortcomings of limited capacity 
to carry cargo and personnel as well as limited medical support.   
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Table 12.   Feasibility Study for LCS with IW mission package (From Greenfield & 
Ingram, 2011) 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Despite having limitations in cargo and personnel capacity and lack of medical 
support, the LCS is still deemed as a feasible solution to conducting HA/DR operations, 
due to its high sprint speed, which allows the LCS to reach the disaster region faster than 
any other ships. By installing the proposed IW mission packages, previously identified 
shortcomings can be mitigated. By developing the HA/DR Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) for the LCS, they can be better prepared to conduct HA/DR operations. 
The LCS HA/DR CONOPS does not differ much from the combat CONOPS in 
terms of the employment. The LCS can be deployed as an integrated force with the 
CSG/ESG, as limited independent operations. When used for HA/DR operations, the 
LCS should be deployed for focused mission, which means that it should be installed 




be suitably equipped with the capability to carry out HA/DR operations more effectively 
and efficiently. The following describes some of the vignettes and the CONOPs for LCSs 
conducting HA/DR operations. 
1. Integrated with CSG/ESG 
The LCS may be deployed as an integrated force with the CSG/ESG, when the 
entire integrated force is tasked for HA/DR operations. The integrated force will travel at 
the fastest possible speed, dictated by the slowest ship speed in the force. Depending on 
the distance travelled, there might be a need for the LCS to refuel. Refueling can be 
conducted either by CLF assets or from the ESG/CSG. The LCS is likely to be equipped 
with the SUW, ASW or MCM mission package and not the IW mission package.   
Essential supplies should then be quickly transferred from the aircraft carriers or 
amphibious ships to the LCS, based on the availability of space. Essential supplies here 
refer to any relief aid supplies, such as food, water, medicine and shelter items. As the 
LCS is already equipped with a mission package, there might be insufficient space to 
load a large quantity of supplies on it. Wherever possible, the LCS should unload its 
combat equipment, such as sensors and weapons equipment onto the aircraft carrier and 
amphibious ship, to make space for the relief aid supplies. One example is that the 
VTUAV can be deployed to take off from the LCS, and to land onto the aircraft carrier or 
amphibious ship. The VTUAV container onboard the LCS can then be used to store relief 
aid supplies.   
Upon reaching a predetermined location where the LCS can travel to the disaster 
country without re-fueling (approximately 1,000nm away from the destination), the LCS 
will break away from the CSG/ESG and travel at sprint speed to the disaster region to 
deliver the initial relief package. Upon reaching the disaster region, the LCS will link up 
with the local authorities, unload and hand over the relief aid supplies to the host nation, 
and survey the area. The survey report will then be sent to the CSG/ESG so that prior 
planning by the CSG/ESG commander can be conducted. Due to the small number of 
personnel support from the LCS, operations on the port will be limited. It is however 
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important that a small security force be set up for the protection of the troops and the 
guarding of the relief aid supplies. 
The LCS will subsequently link up with the CSG/ESG when they have reached 
the disaster region, and assist in the subsequent HA/DR operations. 
2. Independent Operations 
The LCS can also be tasked to conduct the HA/DR operations independently. 
There are two vignettes that can happen – either the LCS is deployed from home, or the 
LCS is already out on limited independent operation and then deployed for HA/DR 
operations. 
a. Deployed from home 
The LCS deployed from home has the advantage of being installed with 
the IW mission package, and also packed with supplies specifically for HA/DR needs. 
The LCS crew can also be specifically selected and catered for HA/DR operations, such 
as personnel with experience in HA/DR operations, or personnel with specific expertise, 
e.g., doctors and surgeons.   
b. Deployed in the midst of an independent operation 
The LCS could be in the midst of a limited independent operation, when it 
was tasked to conduct the HA/DR operations. This scenario may be the least desirable, as 
the LCS would not have sufficient supplies, or manpower to conduct the HA/DR 
operations efficiently.  Upon the tasking, the LCS will proceed to the disaster region at 
sprint speed. Depending on the distance to the destination, there may be a need for CLF 
assets midway to provide refueling to the LCS. Other than providing fuel to the LCS, the 
CLF assets can also replenish supplies, e.g., food, water so that the LCS has sufficient 
supplies to last the journey, and also be able to provide some to the disaster victims. This 
is important for the LCS, which is tasked for HA/DR operations when it is deployed in 
the midst of an independent operation. Upon reaching the disaster region, the LCS will 
link up with the local authorities, unload and hand over the relief aid supplies to the host 
nation. Due to the small number of personnel support from the LCS, operations on the 
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port will be limited. It is however important that a small security force be set up for the 
protection of the troops and the guarding of the relief aid supplies. The LCS will 
subsequently link up with other ships and continue HA/DR operations as required. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
A. INCREASING NEED FOR HA/DR OPERATIONS 
With the increasing number of disasters, there is an increase in HA/DR 
operations. The Navy has identified HA/DR operations as the leading OTW, and is 
increasingly taking the lead in coordination of HA/DR operations amongst the NGOs and 
other military forces. As such, every ship inventory of the Navy must be considered for 
its feasibility in HA/DR operations, in order to maximize the Navy’s efforts in such 
operations.   
B. FEASIBILITY OF LCS IN HA/DR OPERATIONS 
The LCS is one of the newest ships in the Navy’s inventory. The key highlight of 
the LCS is its high sprint speed and its modular design. Its high sprint speed enables it to 
get to places must faster than other ships, and also increases it survivability. Its modular 
design allows it to undertake different missions, with different mission packages, 
increasing its flexibility for combat operations.   
A qualitative Systems Engineering study was conducted in this thesis to study the 
feasibility of the LCS in conducting HA/DR operations. The study includes the functional 
decomposition and the mission requirements of a HA/DR operation. The LCS was 
assessed using the mission requirements as an evaluation metrics. Despite the LCS 
having several advantages such as high sprint speed and shallow draft, there were some 
shortcomings in its ability to conduct HA/DR operation, including limited capacity for 
cargo and personnel, limited medical support and limited endurance.   
C. POSSIBLE MISSION PACKAGE AND CONOPS 
To overcome the shortcomings of the LCS in HA/DR operations, the IW mission 
package primarily for HA/DR operations was designed. Equipment within this mission 
package was derived from the functional decomposition of HA/DR operations, and will 
enable the LCS to conduct HA/DR operations more effectively and efficiently. The IW 
mission package helps the LCS mitigate some shortcomings in conducting HA/DR 
operations. A set of CONOPs were also developed, based on the vignettes of the LCS 
 56 
being deployed as part of an integrated force with CSG/ESG or independently. The 
CONOPS developed will enable commanders to understand better the advantages and 
disadvantages of deploying LCS for HA/DR operations in the different vignettes. 
In summary, the LCS by itself or with current mission packages has several 
shortcomings that rendered it not as feasible for HA/DR operations. It must be 
complemented with a specific logistical mission package, e.g., IW mission package to 
improve its capability.  
D. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
The Navy has already taken an interest in the development of the IW mission 
package for the LCS, with the aim of the mission package being used for HA/DR 
operations. Several in-depth, quantitative analytical studies should be conducted to study 
the type and quantity of equipment in the IW mission package, the number of IW mission 
packages required for the Navy, and also the deployment of the IW packages. 
Additionally, these studies should be able to demonstrate the possibility of measurable 
improvement in delivery of relief aid, security, and overall HA\DR mission performance, 
while including cost and risk considerations. 
An optimization model of the number of LCS to deploy for HA/DR operations 
can also be conducted. While one LCS may not be sufficient to carry sufficient cargo and 
manpower, several LCS can be deployed as a HA/DR force. This HA/DR force will be 
able to carry much more cargo and manpower, and yet be able to get to the disaster 
victims fast to provide the relief aid supplies. However, there will be trade-offs, including 
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